Introduction 

Over the past few months, tensions in the Baltic Sea region have risen. Russia’s hybrid and direct warfare has become bolder. These actions include cyber attacks, GPS interference, and increased air and naval patrols near the Baltic states. While diplomatic talks remain open, they have had little success in reducing tensions. This shows the need for stronger regional readiness. At the same time, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is working to strengthen its own regional stability. The region is expanding programs focused on emergency response and transport links. These efforts aim to improve cooperation between the Baltic states and the rest of Europe.

Rising Russian Aggression and NATO Involvement 

Russian actions in the Baltic Sea area have put more strain on governments and regional groups. This strain comes from safety risks, damage to roads and cables, and new plans for defense. In September, Estonia reported that Russian jets flew into its airspace without approval and did not respond to NATO calls. Latvia and Lithuania have also reported many similar drone flights. These flights disrupt tracking systems and raise fears of both covert and overt attacks.

Reports of a Russian shadow fleet have raised new concerns about risks to undersea cables and other key systems. In response, NATO states and EU partners have increased joint efforts to protect ships and sea routes. These efforts build on earlier deals, including a shared agreement to protect undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. They draw on the Undersea Infrastructure Network (CUI-Network), which was formed in May 2025. In November 2025, members of this group met in Rome for the first time with NATO allies, EU states, and private companies. Their main goal was to protect cables and pipelines beneath the Baltic and Mediterranean seas.

Russia has also taken steps to “unsettle rather than inflict real damage.” These actions aim to wear down people in the Baltic states and make long-term security efforts harder to keep up. As a result, several Baltic governments have asked NATO to move beyond air patrols and adopt stronger air defenses. These would include ground-based sensors and detection systems. Additionally, work on the joint Baltic Defense Line has continued as a result. As the land is flat and lacks natural barriers, these man-made defenses are needed to slow or guide ground movement.

These changes matter for the CBSS because they connect directly to its role of supporting regional safety. Hybrid actions often affect everyday people first, especially when they disrupt drones or important systems like communication or energy networks. Even though increased Russian hybrid activity does not change what the CBSS is officially responsible for, it does make its work more urgent. By helping member countries share information faster and by working closely with NATO and the EU, the CBSS can play an important role in keeping the region stable and secure.

Building Sustainable Development and Resilience

As efforts to limit Russian influence continue, the CBSS is also working to support long-term development in the region. These two goals often support each other. Projects that strengthen the regional economy can also improve defense readiness. One recent example was the completion of the Via Baltica road, which now runs between Tallinn, Estonia, and Warsaw, Poland. This route links the Baltic states to the rest of Europe through the Suwalki Gap. The gap is a narrow stretch of land between Belarus and Russia, where Lithuania and Poland meet. Due to its location, the road could be used to move troops or deliver aid during a crisis. During the 44th session of the Baltic Assembly in November 2025, its president, Timo Suslov, noted that CBSS will focus on enhancing military mobility through projects such as Rail Baltica and Via Baltica.

Between October 28 and 30, the CBSS met in Sopot, Poland, for the annual EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) meeting. The meeting focused on making the Baltic Sea region stronger against threats such as climate change and other crises. One recent crisis was the Ukrainian Refugee Situation. Many civilians fled after the Russian invasion. By the end of August 2025, around one million Ukrainians were in Poland, 1.2 million in Germany, and about 100,000 in the Baltic states. This sudden arrival put a strain on roads, buildings, and services. Programs meant to help refugees still lack funding. In Germany, some counties had to cut services, like social housing, because of budget limits. A survey showed that by October 2025, about 25 percent of refugees still stayed in emergency shelters such as sports halls, tents, or containers.

Thus, it is important to build the ability to act quickly in these crises, especially as tensions with Russia arise. The Civil Protection Network for Baltic Capitals is one such effort. It lets capitals share information, plan together, and run exercises to train authorities for crises. The EUSBSR also suggested making guidelines for citizens for 72-hour periods when they may not have help from outside sources, such as emergency workers or medical staff. During these times, people may need to manage using only the supplies they have at home.

Climate change is already affecting the Baltic Sea region. Its effects are expected to grow. Rainfall and water temperatures have begun to rise. The ice season is also becoming shorter and warmer. These changes are raising sea levels. As a result, some ports and shipping routes may need to be altered. Heavier rainfall is also speeding up coastal erosion, which puts some communities at risk.

To respond to these challenges, the CBSS created ClimaResponse. This program focuses on planning for extreme weather. Its first project created guidelines to help cities plan adaptation measures for vulnerable groups, such as older people and people with disabilities. Cities now use these guidelines to put measures in place for crises. Examples include SMS warning systems and misting stations. These stations help reduce heat islands, where city temperatures are higher than nearby areas.

In late September 2025, ClimaResponse led emergency drills in Kristiansand, Norway. The drills tested how authorities would respond to major flooding. They were based on a real flood that took place in October 2017. During the drills, local officials used new tools. These included software that tracks water levels in real time and translation tools for communication in many languages. The Kristiansand crisis team practiced how officials and residents would respond to a similar flood. The results helped the city prepare for future emergencies. Other regional authorities can also use this information to improve their own responses.

Conclusion

Building the security capabilities of the Baltic Sea region is one of the most pressing issues that the CBSS faces. The need to respond to the threat of Russian interference is more urgent every day, as its hybrid operations become more frequent. This need is highlighted by the fact that 40 percent of people in Baltic cities believe that their country will face a serious crisis in the next ten years, and 49 percent believe that military attacks are a major threat. Along with this, the development of the Baltic Sea as a sustainable and prosperous region remains a main goal for the CBSS. Not only is it important as a road for achieving the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda, but it also helps build the resilience of the region by improving its preparedness in times of crisis.

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