Introduction

As of December 1962, the conflict in Katanga has been active for about two years. During this time, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) Peacekeeping Forces have failed to bring peace to this region. Foreign intervention has also caused increasing instability within the Congolese state. At this point, the UNSC is less than two decades old. As such, it must rely on principles behind actions rather than solely on past resolutions or precedent.

Increasing Failures of the ONUC Peacekeeping Forces

One important topic is the role of peacekeeping in civilian safety. In November 1961, ONUC forces were already in the Congo. They were initially sent to help organize the withdrawal of Belgian troops and were ordered not to use force. However, the UNSC then issued Resolution 169, which called for the removal of Katangese mercenaries and supported Congolese control over Katanga, allowing the use of force to do so.

This shifted ONUC’s goals from keeping peace in the Congo to the active protection of Congolese sovereignty. Critics like France and the United Kingdom argue that this is a stretch of UN power and that it could weaken any future secessionist movements. Supporters claim that this is important to keep the Congo stable. Despite Cold War tensions, the United States and the Soviet Union both support this course of action because they both have the same anti-secessionist goals.

The United States holds an anti-Katanga policy for a few reasons. First, the successful secession of Katanga may lead to a “domino effect,” which could cause other states to defect after seeing Katanga’s successful independence. This could lead to the Congo and other countries losing stability. Also, the United States wants to protect its public image. A successful secessionist movement and the collapse of the Congo could be viewed as a result of neocolonialist pressures. This would look bad for the Western bloc of countries in the grand scheme of the Cold War. The Soviet Union also strongly opposed Katanga’s secession, seeing it as a Western plot to control the Congo and its resources. The USSR supported the central government in Léopoldville and pushed the UN to take action to reunite the country.

The United Kingdom argues the main goal of ONUC should not be to find a military solution. This could establish a dangerous precedent for future UN missions, allowing military action to enforce its will. It is important to understand that allied countries may not have the same policy on Katangese independence. While the US and UK agreed that the Congo should stay together, the UK disagreed with the US about using military force through the UN to achieve it.

Increasing Instability in the Congo Due to Foreign Intervention

Katangese independence is strongly connected to the stability of the Congo as a state. However, the larger effects of the Cold War are another factor that affects its stability. The Cold War has led to shifting international relations and new forms of neocolonialism within the Congo.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two main foreign forces in post-colonial Congo. The United States is concerned about an increasing communist sentiment in the Congo. So, they have helped to fund anti-communist movements in the state. In 1961, the CIA made plans to assassinate Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, whom the United States believed to favor the Soviet cause. These plans were never carried out, but the spread of pro-Western ideas eventually led to his assassination by the military. These anti-communist ideas are also seen in the United States’ efforts to create a pro-Western government in the Congo. In addition to working with the Congolese military, they also used mercenaries from Europe, South Africa, and Rhodesia to help carry out this goal.

The Soviet Union had a different approach. The Soviet Union hoped to expand its influence to Africa and tap into its large supply of natural resources, such as copper and cobalt. Czechoslovakia is another communist state with similar goals. In the first major Soviet-Czechoslovak joint mission, the KGB, the Soviet Union’s intelligence agency, and the Czechoslovak State Security (StB) made plans to invade the Congo. Their goal was to find information about politicians and any ties they had to Western powers. At the same time, the Soviet Union was also giving aid to the Congo. This was in the form of food, planes, helicopters, and money, and it has continued throughout 1962. This is viewed as an attempt to make the state more sympathetic to Soviet ideas.

The United States and the Soviet Union have a push-pull effect. Efforts from the CIA undermined those by the KGB, and vice versa. Foreign intervention and competing political interests have weakened the Congo, worsening government systems and making the people uneasy.

Many other countries have their own goals in the Congo. Belgium maintains a strong influence in the Congo, even after the country gained independence. The Katangan President Moïse Tshombe has relied on Belgian officers, weapons, and advisors to support his government. Belgium has sent weapons and political and military advisors to support Katanga. This indicates that Belgium is backing Katanga’s attempt to break away and still has strong ties to the region. One main reason is the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), a Belgian mining company operating there. Belgium believes that supporting Katanga could lead to a government that allows Belgium to keep influence over UMHK, giving it continued control over mining in the region. This involvement deepened divisions between Katanga and the rest of the Congo and strengthened secessionist ideas.

Conclusion

Delegates must consider how their actions might change the future of the UNSC as a whole, not just the Congo. Precedents are being newly established in 1962. It is vital to view the situation in the context of the time. During this period, Cold War tensions are strong. There are many overseas territories and colonies also fighting for their independence. The choices made by the UNSC will decide the fate of these regions as well.

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