Introduction

Recent events in drug trafficking are impacting Latin America. In late 2025, diplomatic issues and increased conflicts have changed how countries tackle crime. Political conditions in Latin America also vary widely. Trust between some states is decreasing, and for others, conflicts are rising.

Diplomatic Concerns

The political impact of the drug trade in Latin America is profound. It continues to shape relations between the United States and regional partners. Anti‑drug policies are not only about ending narcotics trafficking; they also influence questions of sovereignty, trust, and power. Governments in the Americas depend on one another for intelligence sharing, maritime patrols, and joint investigations. When one country is perceived to violate international law, cooperation weakens, and criminal organizations such as cartels can exploit the resulting gaps.

On September 2, 2025, the Trump administration launched a campaign of military strikes against vessels suspected of drug trafficking. Since then, the United States has carried out more than thirty such strikes as part of its declared “war on drugs.” Washington has argued that these operations target boats linked to cartels and terrorist groups, but officials in Latin America have often challenged whether the vessels were truly connected to smuggling. Human rights advocates and the United Nations have warned that using military force instead of law enforcement risks violating international law and undermining human rights protections. These concerns have fueled diplomatic tensions across the region.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro said he would stop working with the United States. He argued that the “fight against drugs must come after the human rights of the Caribbean people.” By November 13, 2025, Petro clarified that Colombia would continue working with international agencies. Still, the statements revealed how fragile partnerships in counter‑narcotics efforts can be when trust is shaken.

The controversy extended beyond Colombia. On November 16, 2025, Ecuadorians voted ‘no’ to hosting US military bases in the country. The failed proposal was backed by President Daniel Noboa. Noboa believed the proposal was crucial to confronting drug traffickers. The rejection reflected public skepticism about US military involvement in domestic security matters and highlighted the limits of regional support for Washington’s approach.

When intelligence sharing slows, it creates gaps. Governments lose access to information such as routes and shipments. Criminal organizations, like drug cartels, can exploit these gaps. This can weaken the systems that expose criminal groups. Delegates should think about how to balance the need for intelligence with anti-drug-driven policies and attacks.

Conflict Escalation

The political influence of drug trafficking can be understood in two dimensions. Domestically, it is tied to the United States’ struggle with overdose deaths and the broader public health crisis. Internationally, it intersects with questions of governance and stability in Venezuela. On December 10, 2025, the United States seized a Venezuelan oil tanker for alleged violations of sanctions. One week later, Washington announced a naval blockade on oil tankers entering and leaving Venezuela. US officials argued that the government of Nicolás Maduro, widely criticized for its authoritarian practices, was using stolen oil revenues to finance drug trafficking and human smuggling.

Sanctions, strikes, and seizures may be used to directly target drug traffickers. Between September 2, 2025, and December 19, 2025, the death toll from 28 US strikes on civilian vessels is 104. These strikes have been initiated by the US government. They claim to be against individuals suspected of transporting drugs.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio insists that this is all part of an anti-drug operation. This increase in attacks is part of a formal operation known as Operation Southern Spear. This plan is aimed at targeting narco-terrorist organizations and disrupting illegal drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. Approximately 15,000 US military personnel have been deployed so far. This is one of the largest US military buildups since the Cold War.

On December 20, 2025, the United States Coast Guard seized an oil tanker connected to Venezuela for sanctions violations. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem declared that “the United States will continue to pursue the illicit movement of sanctioned oil that is used to fund narco‑terrorism in the region.” Such actions are intended to disrupt the financial networks that sustain organized crime and trafficking. At the same time, they carry the risk of heightening political tensions both within Venezuela and across the wider region.

Tensions peaked on January 3, 2026, when United States forces captured Nicolás Maduro during a military operation that the US described as part of an anti‑narcotics campaign. The US had long pursued Maduro on federal charges, including narco‑terrorism and drug trafficking, which were first brought in 2020. Under both the Biden and Trump administrations, the United States refused to recognize Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president, instead regarding him as the leader of a “narco‑state.” In August 2025, the Trump administration increased the reward for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to up to USD 50 million, reflecting this stance, and it framed the January operation as an effort to enforce that legal case. Maduro’s capture was swiftly followed by his transfer to New York to face the longstanding US indictments.

Conclusion

Through sanctions and military strikes, political influence in Latin American waters is growing. The crisis over drug trafficking affects the entire region, with some governments resisting US military force while others remain supportive, reflecting Latin America’s fragmented interests. For delegates, the central question is whether these policies genuinely weaken drug trafficking operations or whether they primarily contribute to diplomatic strain and instability.

Bibliography

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