Introduction

The relationship between France and its overseas territories is complex. A lot of these territories depend on France’s help but also value their autonomy. Thus, France’s regions hope to create a solution for economic development and stability that both parties agree with. Delegates in committee should ensure the voices of these territories are heard when making decisions. A simple separation from France is not what all territories might need or want.

Consequences of Economic Struggles

In November 2025, France’s overseas territories minister, Naïma Moutchou, visited New Caledonia. The purpose was to engage with local authorities and economic stakeholders about the territory’s ongoing political and economic crisis, following the civil unrest and protests of 2024. Many small and medium-sized businesses were damaged or shut down during the unrest, weakening local supply chains and slowing economic recovery. The territory’s GDP and fiscal revenues have dropped significantly since the protests, with GDP falling by over 13 percent. This was one of the steepest declines in the territory’s recent history.

The meeting also addressed the future political status of New Caledonia and other French overseas territories.  This has also been debated in UN decolonization forums and in recent negotiations between France and local leaders. In mid-January 2026, French President Macron will resume talks with the territory’s leaders. This will build on discussions held in 2025 to give New Caledonia increased autonomy. Currently, significant disagreements remain over the pace and structure of how to establish New Caledonia as a “State within the Republic.” Proposed compromises include granting residents a dual status (retaining French citizenship while creating a distinct New Caledonian nationality), giving the territory certain powers in international relations, and outlining a process that could allow New Caledonia to achieve greater sovereignty or full self-governance.

These talks arose as government profits in New Caledonia faced a 26 percent drop in 2025. This was more than the expected 20 percent, which severely limited the government’s ability to fund services. Budget shortfalls have affected funding for healthcare, education, housing, and infrastructure, increasing social vulnerability and public dissatisfaction. The territorial government also struggles with debt from past loans. The New Caledonian government carries the burden of repayment, as it relies heavily on state-guaranteed loans from France. This pushes public debt to exceptionally high levels.

Economic losses have disproportionately affected Indigenous Kanak and low-income communities, widening existing social and economic inequalities. UN discussions emphasize that any transition toward greater autonomy would require economic stabilization, debt management, and institutional capacity-building to avoid further instability. As a non-self-governing territory, New Caledonia has limited capacity to independently negotiate international economic support, trade agreements, or development financing. With rising unemployment and shrinking revenues, local governments are primarily focused on mitigating financial loss, highlighting the fragility of the territory’s economy and its limited capacity for growth.

Citizenship Reforms

Mayotte is a French overseas department located in the Indian Ocean between Madagascar and the African mainland, near Mozambique. It is France’s poorest overseas department. More than 75 percent of its population lives below the poverty line. Many residents face insecure housing, inadequate food, and limited social protection. Mayotte also has one of the highest population growth rates in France, at around 4 percent per year. This is largely driven by high fertility rates and migration from Comoros, Madagascar, and other regions.

Recently, Mayotte changed its citizenship laws. Under a 2018 law, children born in Mayotte to foreign parents could obtain French citizenship if at least one parent had been a legal resident in France or Mayotte for at least three months. In 2025, the rules were tightened. Now, both parents must have lived in Mayotte for at least one year at the time of the child’s birth for automatic citizenship to apply. The government says the change aims to reduce irregular migration and lessen the strain on schools, healthcare, and housing.

Critics argue it undermines family unity and creates unequal rights for children based on their parents’ status. By ending birthright citizenship just in Mayotte, some experts say France is unfairly attributing the island’s poverty and insecurity mainly to high migration. Migration does contribute to overcrowded housing and strains local services, but changing the citizenship law does not address the issues for the locals.

These reforms highlight the tension between migration control and human rights in overseas territories. The tighter citizenship laws risk marginalizing children born to migrants. Such children would be more vulnerable to exclusion from schooling, healthcare, and social services. Advocates stress the importance of ensuring that citizenship laws respect families and do not disproportionately harm children or long‑term residents.

At the same time, local leaders and citizens emphasize the need for policies that address demographic pressures and support social stability. Striking a balance will require dialogue among French authorities, Mayotte’s local institutions, and international observers.

Conclusion

France continues to face challenges with its overseas territories. Recent events show why certain reforms are needed. Restoring peace and dignity in these territories remains essential. The success of policy reform depends on delegates’ ability to address concerns on both sides—France and the local populations. Delegates should make sure that economic stability is improved across the territories and that collaborative solutions uplift the citizens.

Bibliography

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